Introduction
Let T be a first order theory formulated in the language L and P a new relation symbol not in L. Let ϕ(P ) be an L ∪ {P }-sentence. Let us say that ϕ(P ) defines P implicitly in T if T proves ϕ(P ) ∧ ϕ(P ′ ) → ∀x(P (x) ↔ P (x ′ )). Beth's definability theorem states that if ϕ(P ) defines P implicitlly in T then P (x) is equivalent to an L-formula.
However, if we consider implicit definability in a given model alone, the situation changes. For a more precise explanation, let us say that a subset A of a given model M of T is implicitly definable if there exists a sentence ϕ(P ) such that A is the unique set with (M, A) |= ϕ(P ). It is easy to find a structure in which two kinds of definability (implicit definability and first order definability) are different. For example, let us consider the structure M = (N∪Z, <), where < is a total order such that any element in the Z-part is greater than any element in the N-part. The N-part is not first order definable in M, because the theory of M admits quantifier elimination after adding the constant 0 (the least element) and the successor function to the language. But the N-part is implicitly definable in M, because it is the unique non trivial initial segment without the last element. On the other hand, for a given structure, we can easily find an elementary extension in which two notions coincide.
In this paper, we shall consider implicit definability of the standard part {0, 1, ...} in nonstandard models of Peano arithmetic (P A). It is needless to say that the standard part of a nonstandard model of P A is not first order definable. As is stated above, there is a model in which every set defined implicitly is first order definable. So we ask whether there is a model of P A in which the standard part is implicitly definable.
In §1, we define a certain class of formulas, and show that in any model of P A the standard part is not implicitly defined by using such formulas.
§2 is the main section of the present paper, we shall construct a model of P A in which the standard part is implicitly defined. To construct such a model, first we assume a set theoretic hypothesis ♦ S λ + λ , which is an assertion of the existence of a very general set. Then we shall eliminate the hypothesis using absoluteness for the existence of a model having a tree structure with a certain property.
In this paper L is a first order countable language. L-structures are denoted by M, N, M i , · · · . We do not strictly distinguish a structure and its universe. A, B, · · · will be used for denoting subsets of of some L-structure. Finite tuples of elements from some L-structure are denoted byā,b, · · · . We simply write A ⊂ M for expressing that A is a subset of the universe of M.
Undefinability result
Let us first recall the definition of implicit definability. Definition 1 Let M be an L-structure. Let P be a unary second order variable. A subset A of M is said to be implicitly definable in M if there is an L ∪ {P }-sentence ϕ(P ) with parameters such that A is the unique solution to ϕ(P ), i.e. {A} = {B ⊂ M : M |= ϕ(B)}.
In this section L is the language {0, 1, +, ·, <}, and P A denotes the Peano arithmetic formulated in L. We shall prove that the standard part is not implicitly definable in any model of P A by using a certain form of formulas. We fix a model M of P A, and work on M.
Definition 2 An L∪{P }-formula ϕ(ȳ) (with parameters) will be called simple if it is equivalent to a prenex normal form
where Q i 's are quantifiers and f and g are definable functions. If Q 1 = ∀ then ϕ will be called a simple Π n -formula. Similarly it is called a simple Σ n -formula if Q 1 = ∃.
Remark 3
If P is an initial segment of M, then 1. a 1 ∈ P ∧ a 2 ∈ P is equivalent to max{a 1 , a 2 } ∈ P ; 2. a 1 ∈ P ∨ a 2 ∈ P is equivalent to min{a 1 , a 2 } ∈ P .
An L-formula ϕ(x) is equivalent to a formula of the form P (f (x)), where f is a definable function such that f (x) = 0 if ϕ(x) holds and f (x) = a (a is a nonstandard element) otherwise. In what follows, an initial segment I M will be called a cut if I is closed under successor. The statement that P is a cut is expressed by a simple Π 2 -formula.
We shall prove that the standard part is not implicitly definable by a finite number of simple Π 2 -formulas. In fact we can prove more.
Proposition 4 Let I 0 be a cut of M with I 0 < a i.e. any element of I 0 is smaller than a. Let {ϕ i (P ) : i ≤ n} be a finite set of simple formulas. If I 0 satisfies {ϕ i (P ) : i ≤ n}, then there is another cut I < a which also satisfies {ϕ i (P ) : i ≤ n}.
Let us say that a cut I is approximated by a decreasing ω-sequence, if there is a definable function f (x) with I = {a ∈ M : (∀m ∈ ω) a ≤ f (m)}. Similarly we say that I is approximated by an increasing ω-sequence if there is a definable function g(x) with I = {a ∈ M : (∃m ∈ ω) a ≤ g(m)}. Notice that no cut of M is approximated by both a decreasing ω-sequence and an increasing ω-sequence.
Proof of Proposition 4:
. By the remark just after Proposition 4, we can assume that I 0 cannot be approximated by a decreasing ω-sequence. We shall show that there is an initial segment I with I 0 I < a and M |= i≤n ϕ i (I). Since I 0 satisfies ϕ i (P ), for each
By choosing maximum such b 1 < b 0 , we may assume that b 1 ∈ dcl(ā, b 0 ), wherē a are parameters necessary for defining f i 's and
By using recursion we can choose a definable function l(x) with l(m) = h m (a) (the m-time application of h) for each m ∈ ω. Now we put
Since m < h(m) holds for any m ∈ ω, by overspill, there is a nostandard m * such that m * < h(m * ). This shows that I is an initial segment different from I 0 . Now we show:
Claim For all i ≤ n and for alld ∈ M, there isē ∈ M such that
Let d ∈ M and i ≤ n be given. We can assume that ∀y(f i (d,ȳ) ∈ I) holds in M. So by the definitions of I and l, for all k ∈ ω, we have M |= ∀y(
On the other hand, by our choice of h and l, we can findē with
Hence, for thisē, we have
Corollary 5 The standard part is not implicitly definable by a finite number of simple Σ 3 -formulas.
Definability result
In this section we aim to prove the following theorem:
Theorem 6 There is a model of P A in which the standard part is implicitly definable.
Instead of proving the theorem, we prove a more general result (Theorem 10), from which Theorem 6 easily follows. For stating the result, we need some preparations. We assume the language L contains a binary predicate symbol <, a constant symbol 0 and a unary function symbol S. We fix a complete L-theory T with a partial definable function F (x, y) such that the following sentences are members of T :
• < is a linear order with the first element 0;
• For each x, S(x) is the immediate successor of x with respect to <;
Remark 7 Any completion of P A satisfies our requirements stated above.
Let P be a new unary predicate symbol not in L. Throughout this section ψ * (P ) is the conjunction of the following L ∪ {P }-sentences:
1. P is a cut (non-empty proper initial segment closed under S), i.e.
2. For no x and z with P (z), is {F (x, y) : y < z} ∩ P unbounded in P , i.e.
It is clear that in any model M of T , the "standard" part I = {S n (0) : n ∈ ω} satisfies ψ * (P ), i.e. the sentence ψ * (P ) holds in the L ∪ {P }-structure (M, I).
Definition 8 A model M of T will be called ψ * -appropriate if the following two conditions are satisfied:
Remark 9 In case that T is a completion of P A, the part (b) of the condition 2 in the above definition does not occur, because in any model of T no definable proper subset is closed under S.
Theorem 10
There is an appropriate model of T * .
We shall prove the theorem above by a series of claims. For a period of time, we fix an infinite cardinal λ. First we need some definition.
Definition 11 Let M be a model of T and ϕ(x,ā) a formula with parameters from M. We say that ϕ(x,ā) is Γ sind F -big (in M) if in some (any) |T | + -saturated model N ≻ M there is A ⊂ N with |A| ≤ |T | such that for any finite number of distinct elements a 1 , ..., a n ∈ N \ A, and any elements b 1 , ..., b n ∈ N, we have
In the above definition, if λ = ℵ 0 , we replace the condition |A| ≤ |T | by |A| < ℵ 0 .
Let us briefly recall the definition of bigness defined in [2] . Let R / ∈ L be a unary predicate symbol. A statement (or an infinitary L ∪ {R}-sentence) Γ(R) ϕ(x,ȳ) ) means that setting R(x) = ϕ(x,ȳ) [sō y is a parameter] makes Γ true):
Now let Γ(ϕ) be the statement "ϕ is Γ sind F -big". Then this Γ satisfies the above four axioms: It is easy to see that our Γ saitsfies Axioms 1, 3 and 4. So let us prove Axiom 2. Suppose that neither ϕ nor ψ are big. Let M be a model of T and N ≻ M be |T | + -satrurated. Let A be a subset of N of cardinality ≤ |T |. Since ϕ is not big, A cannot witness the definition of bigness, so there are a finite number of elements a 1 , ..., a n ∈ N \ A with no repetition and
.., a n } cannot witness the definition of bigness, hence there are a n+1 , ..., a m ∈ N \ (A ∪ {a 1 , ..., a n }) with no repetition and b n+1 , ...,
Since A was chosen arbitrarily, this shows that ϕ ∨ ψ is not big. 
, (iii) the cofinality of C 1 with respect to < is µ 1 and (iv) the coinitiality of C 2 (i.e. the cofinality of C 2 with respect to the reverse ordering) is µ 2 .
Proof. See [2] . For more details, see [3] . Now we expand the language L by adding new binary predicate symbols. Let L * = L ∪ {E 1 , E 2 , < les , < tr }. We expand the L-structure M defined in claim A to an L * -structure M * by the following interpretation. For a ∈ M, let i(a) = min{i < λ + : a ∈ M i+1 }.
E
iff a and b realize the same Dedekind cut of
The relation < tr defines a preorder on M * and induces a tree structure on the E 2 -equivalence classes. This tree structure (M * /E 2 , < tr ) is a definable object of M * eq . (We do not use a new symbol for the order induced by < tr .) Simiarly < lev induces a linear order on the E 1 -equivalence classes. Let R be the definable function which maps a E 2 to a E 1 . R is considered as a rank function which assigns a level to each node of the tree. Then < tr , < lev , R is an L * -tree in the sense of [1] . A subset B of M * /E 2 will be called a branch of the tree if (i) it is linearly ordered by < tr , (ii) a E 2 ∈ B and b ≤ tr a imply b E 2 ∈ B and (iii) the set {R(a E 2 ) : a E 2 ∈ B} of all levels in B is unbounded in M * /E 1 .
Claim B Every branch of the tree (M
Proof. Let B be a branch of the tree (M * /E 2 , < tr , < lev , R). We show that B is definable in M * . Let I be the <-initial segment determined by B, i.e.
It is easy to see that I and B are interdefinable in M * . In fact, we have b E 2 ∈ B if and only if there exist c ∈ I and d ∈ M * \ I such that
= ∅ has a strictly larger level than b E 2 and
If the cofinality of (I, M * \ I) is (λ + , λ + ), then I is definable in M by the property (e) of Claim A, so B is definable in M * . So we may assume that the cofinality is not (λ + , λ + ). First suppose that cf(I) ≤ λ. Then we can choose a set {a i : i < λ} which is cofinal in I. Choose j < λ + with cf(j) = λ and {a i :
, where e is an element from M j+1 \ M j . So we may assume that there is a set {a
Since the other case can be treated similarly, we can assume that b ∈ I. Then b E 2 is included in some interval [0, a i ]. By the definition of I, there is c E 2 ∈ B such that b E 2 < lev c E 2 and a i < c. But then b and c determine different Dedekind cuts of M j , hence b and c are not comparable with respect to < tr . This contradicts our assumption that B is a branch.
Second suppose that the coinitiality of M * \ I is ≤ λ and that the cofinality of I is λ + . As in the first case, we can choose j < λ + such that M j \ I is coinitial in M * \ I. Choose d ∈ I which bounds I ∩ M j from above and an element e ∈ M j+1 \ M j . Then I is defined by the formula ∀y[d < y ∧ y < lev e → x < y]. Lastly the case where the cofinality of (I, M * \ I) is (µ 1 , µ 2 ) with µ 1 , µ 2 ≤ λ is impossible by the definition of branch.
Let T * be the L * -theory of M * . Under the hypothesis of Claim A (i.e. ♦ S λ + λ etc), we have proven the existence of M * |= T * having a tree with the property stated in Claim B. However, by the absoluteness (e.g. Thorem 6 in [1] ), the existence of such a model can be proven without the hypothesis. Moreover, as T * is countable, we can assume that relevant properities of M * expressed by one L * ω 1 ω (Q)-sentence are also possessed by such models. (Q is the quantifier which expresses "there are uncountably many".) Thus in ZFC we can show 1. The tree (N * /E 2 , < tr ) has no undefinable branch;
2. The set N * /E 1 of levels has the cardinality ℵ 1 , but for each b/E 1 ∈ N * /E 1 , {c/E 1 : c/E 1 < lev b/E 1 } is countable; 3. If I is a definable subset of N * with the Dedekind cut (I, N * \ I) of cofinality
Claim D Let N * be a model of T * with the properties stated in Claim C. Then the reduct N of N * to the language L is ψ * -appropriate.
Proof. Toward a contradiction, we assume that there is an undefinable (in the sense of N) subset I ⊂ N with (N, I) |= ψ * (P ) and I = {S n (0) : n ∈ ω}. We show that the cofinality of (I, N * \I) is (ℵ 1 , ℵ 1 ). Suppose that this is not the case. First assume that the cofinality of (I, <) is less than ℵ 1 . As (N * /E 1 , < lev ) has the cofinality ℵ 1 , there is d/E 1 such that {c ∈ I : c ≤ lev d} is unbounded in I. Since I = {S n (0) : n ∈ ω}, we can choose b ∈ I \ {S n (0) : n ∈ ω}. By the fourth condition of Claim C, there is a ∈ N * such that {F (a, c) : c < b} includes {c ∈ I : c ≤ lev d}. So {F (a, c) : c < b} ∩ I is unbounded in I. This contradicts the last clause in the definition of ψ * . Second assume that the coinitiality of N * \ I is less than ℵ 1 . For a similar reason as in the first case, we can find d E 1 such that {c ∈ N * \ I : c ≤ lev d} is unbounded from below in N * \ I. Also we can choose a ∈ N * and b ∈ I such that {F (a, c) : c < b} includes {c ∈ I : c ≤ lev d}. If I ∩ {F (a, c) : c < b} were bounded (from above) say by e ∈ I, then I would be definable in N by the L-formula
contradicting our assumption that I is not definable. So I ∩ {F (a, c) : M i * |= c < b} is not bounded in I. Again this contradicts the last clause in the definition of ψ * . So we have proven that the cofinality of (I, N * \ I) is (ℵ 1 , ℵ 1 ). As in the proof of Claim B, we shall define a set {(b i ) E 2 : i < ℵ 1 } and definable intervals J i ⊂ N * (i < ℵ 1 ) such that for each i < ℵ 1 ,
• J i 's are decreasing;
• there is no element d ∈ J i with d < lev b i .
Suppose that we have chosen d j 's and J j 's for all j < i. Since the cofinality of I and the coinitiality of N * \ I are both ℵ 1 , j<i J i intersects both I and N * \ I. Choose b ∈ j<i J i ∩ I and c ∈ j<i J i ∩ (N * \ I). Then we put J i = {e ∈ N * : N * |= b < e < d}. Choose b i ∈ J i of the minimum level. (Such b i exists and (b i ) E 2 is unique, because every nonempty definable subset of N * /E 1 has the minimum element with respect to < lev . If there are two such elements, they are distinguished by elements of lower levels, contradicting the minimality.) We claim that {(b i ) E 2 : i < ℵ 1 } determines a branch B = {c E 2 : c E 2 ≤ tr (b i ) E 2 for some i}. For this it is sufficient to show that the b i 's are linearly ordered by ≤ tr . Let i ≤ i ′ < ℵ 1 . Then both b i and b i ′ are members of the interval J i . Suppose that b i and b i ′ are not comparable with respect to ≤ tr . They determine different Dedekind cuts of the elements of lower levels. So there is an element c ∈ J i with c < lev b i . This contradicts our choice of b i ∈ J i . By our assumption (the fourth condition in Claim C), the branch B = {(b i ) E 2 : i < ℵ 1 } is definable in N * . It is easy to see that I and B are interdefinable in N * . So I is also definable in N * , hence I is definable in N by the third condition in Claim C. This contradicts our assumption that I is undefinable in N.
